Judge McCurn’s ruling in land-claim case
Sept. 26, 2000

United States District Court
Northern District of New York
The Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, et al., Plaintiffs,
United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor,
The County of Oneida, New York, and The County of Madison, New York, Defendants.
— Neal P. McCurn, S.J.

Memorandum-Decision and Order
By its very nature Indian land claim litigation engenders inflamed passions on all sides; perhaps no more so than when the specter is raised, as it is by the present motions to amend of mass ejectment or eviction of literally thousands of individuals who have been residing on this land for years, and in some instances for generations. Before delving into that highly volatile issue, as well as several other less volatile issues, it is necessary to review at least some aspects of this quarter of a century old territorial dispute.

Background
Between 1778 and 1868, “the United States ... ratified hundreds of treaties with Indian tribes or nations.” Cheung v. United States, 213 F. 3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). In the present case, however, the court is concerned with a number of “treaties” which allegedly the United States did not ratify during that same time frame. This lawsuit is one of several wherein the Oneida Indian Nation of New York State (“the Nation”), the Oneida Indian Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin (“the Wisconsin”), and the Oneida of the Thames (“the Thames”) have sought to establish their rights to approximately six million acres of land located in central New York.

In 1970, the Oneida commenced a “test case” challenging the validity of a 1795 agreement wherein there ancestors conveyed 100,000 acres to the State of New York (“the State”) in violation of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 329 (“the NIA”). Reversing the Second Circuit, in 1974 the Supreme Court unanimously held that purpose of asserting federal question jurisdiction, the Oneidas had stated a possessory claim based upon federal common law. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 67S, 94 S.Ct. 772, 781 (1974) (“Oneida I”). On remand the district court found that the only named defendants, Oneida and Madison Counties (“the Counties”), who for two years in the late 1960s occupied the nearly 900 acres at issue, were liable, as unimproved, of the land which was part of the Oneidas’ 1795 cession of land to the state.

And although it would take another 11 years, eventually, in 1985, the Supreme Court further held in the test case that the Oneidas could maintain a federal common law based action for violation of their possessory rights in their ancestral homeland. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 236, 105, S.Ct. 1245, 1252 (1985) (“Oneida II”). Likewise, the Oneida II Court held that the Oneidas’ claims were not barred by any of the following defenses: preemption, statute of limitations, laches, abatement, ratification or the doctrine of nonjusticiability. Se id at 240-250, 105 S. Ct. at 1254-1260. In affirming the viability of the Oneidas’ claims to their ancestral land, the Supreme Court gave the Oneidas a federal form for their claims, but it left unanswered many important questions.
Especially significant in terms of the present motions is the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance as the scope of the relief to which the Oneidas eventually may be entitled. In an oft-quoted footnote, the Court explained that it did not address the issue of whether, for example, “equitable considerations should limit the relief available to the present day Oneida Indians [,]” because petitioners did not raise that issue in Oneida II; nor did the Second Circuit address it. See id at 272 n.27, 105 S.Ct. at 1271 n.27. “What is more, the Court pointedly” express[ed] no opinion as to whether other considerations may be relevant to the final disposition of this case should Congress not exercise its authority to resolve these far reaching Indian claims.” See id. These unanswered questions pertaining to remedies are at the heart of the motions currently before the court.

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1974, the Nation and the Wisconsin, commenced the present action, again naming only the Counties as defendants. But this time, instead of only one treaty, at issue are roughly 30 separate “agreements,” see Affidavit of William W. Taylor, III (Dec. 7, 1998) (“Taylor Aff.”), exh. A thereto at 14-15, 38, and exhs. 3-32, wherein the State purportedly acquired or transferred from the Oneidas approximately 250,000 acres of land. For most of the past 25 years this case lay dormant while the Oneidas doggedly pursued the test case.

Upon reassignment to this court from Northern District of New York Senior Judge Howard G. Munson, the stay which had been in effect for many years was lifted. When the Counties then refused to consent to the Oneidas and the U.S. amending their respective complaints, plaintiffs filed these motions to amend pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15 (a) and 21. After those filing but before oral argument, consistent with the parties’ renewed interest in settlement negotiations, on February 24, 1999, the court assigned an Order of Reference, appointing Ronald J. Riccio as Settlement Master. Shortly thereafter the parties began negotiating in earnest.

Given the long history of unproductive settlement efforts in all these Oneida land claim actions, at that time the court decided that not to allow any further stays for settlement purposes. Settlement efforts and litigation would proceed on parallel tracks. Therefore, while settlement discussions were ongoing, on March 29, 1999 the court heard oral arguments as to plaintiffs’ motions to amend. Since then, despite yeoman-like efforts by Mr. Riccio, on June 9, 2000, settlement negotiations abruptly ended, forcing court to declare an impasse. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, No. 74-CV-187 (N.D.N.Y. June 22,2000). So, regrettably, this case is back on an active litigation track only, with no immediate prospect of renewed settlement efforts.
Although there is a marked similarity between the Oneidas’ proposed amended complaint and the U.S. proposed amended complaint (“the amended complaints”), there are differences between the two. Therefore, to decide the present motions to amend, it is necessary to separately examine each of those two complaints. Furthermore, while it is obvious that the most controversial proposed amendment is the requested addition of approximately 20,000 private landowners as defendants, there are other amendments which the court must also address and it will do so before turning to the polarizing issue of potential private landowner liability.

I. Oneidas’ Amended Complaint
A comparison of the Oneidas’ original with their amended complaint demonstrates that there are two primary areas of difference between them. The first relates to the parties and the second to the relief sought. Only the Nation and the Tribe are named as plaintiffs in the original complaint, whereas the amended complaint also includes the Thames as a plaintiff. Then, in terms of the defendants, the Oneidas are seeking to add approximately 20,000 or more “persons or entities ... that occupy or have or claim an interest in any of the subject lands ... and their successors and assigns.” Taylor Aff., exh. A thereto at 7. 19. They are further seeking to name the following as defendants: (1) the State of New York (“the State”); (2) the New York State Thruway Authority; (3) Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; and (4) Oneida Valley National Bank. These entities, as well as the defendant Counties, are being such both individually and as representatives of the potential class of landlords described above.

By far the most troublesome difference between the original and the amended complaints, however, is the nature and scope of the relief which the Oneidas are seeking, especially in terms of the private landowners. Originally the relief which they sought was fairly circumscribed, and by most standards comparatively modest. Through these motions, however, the Oneidas are seeking to greatly broaden the scope of relief which they are seeking. Initially they sought the relatively insignificant sum of “at least” 10,000.00 see Taylor Aff., exh. F. thereto at 7; whereas now they are seeking an unspecified amount of monetary damages based upon several factors. On the face of it, the monetary damages which the Oneidas are now seeking are quite broad, especially when considered in light of the potential liability of any single, individual private landowner. More specifically, they are claiming entitlement “to damages from each member of the Landholder Class..., with interest, in the amount of (a) the fair market rental value of the relevant portions of the subject lands, as improved, for the period of their occupancy by that member of the Landholder Class, (b) the amount by which the value of any relevant portion of the subject lands was diminished by any damage, pollution or destruction that occurred during the period of their occupancy by that member of the Landholder Class, (c) the value of all minerals and other resources taken from the subject lands by that member of the Landholder class (and those purporting to act with that members’s permission) during the period of that member’s occupancy of the subject lands, equal to the price of such minerals and other resources in their final marketable state and (d) any diminution in value of the subject lands as a result of any injury to the subject lands arising from the taking of such resources.” Taylor Aff., exh. A thereto at 25-26, 68 (emphasis added). Considering the extensive nature of these damages which they are claiming, and based upon the court’s experience in similar litigation, in all likelihood any amount which the Oneidas eventually may recover will far exceed the $10,000 specified in their original complaint.
Not only is the amount of damages which the Oneidas are seeking greater than the amount which they first sought 25 years ago, but they are expanding the length of time for which they are seeking such damages. When they commenced this action, the Oneidas had pending before the Indian Claims Commission (“the ICC”) claims against the U.S. “The theory of the ICC proceedings was that, by virtue of the NIA, the [U.S.] owed a fiduciary duty to the Oneida[s] ... to protect them against unfair, dealings by third parties when disposing of their lands.” Taylor Aff., exh J. thereto at 2642. The Oneidas alleged that the U.S. breached that duty became purportedly the Oneidas received “grossly inadequate and unconscionable consideration for the sale of their lands to the State.” See id. In that ICC proceeding, the Oneidas sought damages from the U.S. for the period prior to 1951. Consequently, when the Oneidas commenced this action in 1974, they limited their claims form monetary relief to 1951 onward. Since then, however, the Oneidas are now seeking pre-1951 damages, as well as damages incurred after that date. So now the Oneidas are seeking recovery of damages spanning over 200 years.

The Oneidas’ amended complaint also differs significantly from its original insofar as declaratory relief is concerned. The original complaint does not seek declaratory relief is concerned. The original complaint does not seek declaratory relief at all. In contrast, the Oneidas’ amended complaint seeks several explicit declarations, which will be discussed herein. Suffice it to say for now, that although the words “ejectment” or “eviction” do not appear anywhere in the Oneidas’ amended complaint, plainly that is the end result which they hope to obtain through a declaratory judgment.

II. United States’ Amended Complaint
Eventually, almost 24 years after the commencement of this action the U.S. moved to intervene on behalf of the Oneidas. Based upon the court’s experience in land-claim litigation such as this, unfortunately this inexplicable delay on the part of the U.S. is typical of its head-in-the-sand attitude which has dominated its handling of Indian land claims through the years, and indeed through the centuries. In any event, by order dated June 2, 1998, Judge Munson granted the U.S.’ motion for permissive intervention pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (a). Thereafter, on September 3, 1998, one day after the case was reassigned to this court, the U.S. filed its complaint in intervention; and six months later, like the Oneidas, it filed a motion to amend its complaint.

In direct contravention of Local Rule 7. 1(a) (4), formerly Local Rule 15.1, the U.S. did not “set forth specifically the proposed amendments and identify the amendments seeking to add as defendants the State and a landholder class the U.S. its “proposed amended complaint contains a number of textual modifications[,]” yet, the U.S. did not bother to identify those modifications. See United States’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (“U.S. Memo.”) at 3 (emphasis added). Furthermore, despite the U.S.’ declaration that it “has rewritten its Complaint to clarify and facilitate adjudication[,]” it has failed to identify those clarifications, and they are not readily apparent.

In any event, a comparison of the U.S.’ amended complaint with the Oneidas’ reveals that although there are similarities between the two, they are not identical. One similarity is that like the Oneidas, the U.S. is seeking to add the Thames as a plaintiff. Another similarity is that both the U.S. and the Tribal plaintiffs seek to add as defendants the State, along with a class comprised of current occupants of the subject lands, or those claiming an interest in the same. See U.S. Amend. Co at 2, 2: see also Taylor Aff., exh. A thereto at 2-3, 3 and 7, 19. But unlike the Oneidas, the U.S. is not seeking to add the three non-State entities as defendants.

In terms of relief sought, there is one particularly noteworthy contrast between the amended complaint of the U.S. and that of the Oneidas. The Oneidas do not specifically mention ejectment in their amended complaint. Initially the U.S. did, noting in passing that among other forms of relief it is “possibly seeking ejectment.” U.S. Amended Co. at 20, Wherefore clause at (5); see also U.S. Memo. at same 3 (same). In a frantic attempt to back paddle, and when prompted by questioning from the court, the U.S. “decided ... to strike all references to ejectment from [its] amended complaint ... as it applies to the private landowners.” Transcript (Mar. 29, 1999) (“Tr.”) at 21. The U.S. made this concession despite agreeing with the Oneidas that “ejectment is a proper remedy” in this “case of possession.” Id. at 20 (emphasis added).

The reason for this about-face is that the U.S. believed that its original proposed amended complaint was “misinterpreted.” Id. During oral argument, in a transparent but effective attempt to alleviate the fears of the private landowners, the U.S. emphatically declared that it has “never, ever intended that tens of thousands of private landowners and business owners would be forcefully removed from their property.” Id. at 20 (emphasis added). Therefore, as part of its “fervent desire to end this suit in a negotiated settlement that is agreeable to all parties [,]” following oral argument, the U.S. submitted a revised proposed amended complaint, which the court deems to have superseded the U.S.’ original amended complaint. Id. at 21. At the same time, the U.S. confirmed in writing that it had decided “to strike all references to ejectment from the prayer for relief as applied to individual landholders.” Letter from Charles E. O’Connell, Jr., Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Indian Resources Section Environment and Natural Resources Division, to Court (Apr. 7, 1999) (emphasis added). The U.S. was careful though to “retain the right to seek ... ejectment of the State and Counties from appropriate lands within the claim area.” Id; see also U.S. Amended Co. at 22, Wherefore Clause at (5).

Given the predictable maelstrom of controversy which surrounded the filing of these motions to amend, especially as they seek to add countless private landowners as defendants, this abrupt change of heart by the U.S. appears to be nothing more than an unsuccessful attempt to placate a fearful public.

Discussion
I. Addition of the Thames and the State
Needless to say, the prospect of allowing amendment to add the Thames as a plaintiff and the Senate as a defendant is far less controversial than the prospect of allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add some 20,000 private landowners. Indeed, not surprisingly, the Counties are eager to have the State as a co-defendant, and do not object to this aspect of plaintiffs’ motion See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ and Intervenor’s Motions for Leave to File Amended Complaints (“Co. Merno”) at 6, n.6; and Tr. at 25 and 77. The state takes no formal position with respect to these motions to amend. Evidently it viewed its inclusion as a defendant in this lawsuit as a foregone conclusion because although not yet formally a party hereto, it actively participated at every step of the way in the aggressive meditation efforts led by Mr. Riccio. Regardless, the court grants the plaintiffs’ motion to amend as to the State because, among other reasons, they “derive their title from the State ..., [its] presence ... as a defendant should facilitate rather than hinder the resolution of th[is] dispute[.]. See Co. Memo. at 6 n. 6.

Furthermore, although the Counties do not specifically acquiesce in allowing amendment to include claims against the State based upon the federal common law the NIA, and the Canandaigua Treaty, because they do not object to the addition of the State as a defendant, presumably they also do not object to the addition of claims against the State. Otherwise, the Counties’ acquiescence to naming the State as a defendant would be meaningless. Therefore, the court hereby grants plaintiffs’ motion to the extent they are seeking to add the State as a defendant herein and to assert claims against it.
On the other hand, the Counties do not readily agree to the addition of the Thames as a plaintiff. The Counties do not separately address their reasons for opposing inclusion of the Thames, but instead rely upon their general reasons in opposition to amendment, i.e. delay, expense, and prejudice. During oral argument, for the first time, the Counties asserted that supposedly the Thames is not a tribe recognized by the U.S. government, but rather it is a Canadian recognized Tribe and hence not a proper plaintiff to this action. That is an argument best left for another day, however, when the issue is properly before the court with full briefing. Given the history of the Thames’ involvement in this action and the related test case, the court has little difficulty also allowing this particular amendment. To be sure, only the Nation and the Wisconsin originally were named as plaintiffs here and in the test case. During the trial of the test case, however, an oral application was made to have the Thames added as a plaintiff therein. Declaration of Carey R. Ramos (March 18, 1999) at 3, and exh. A thereto. The court granted that relief “in the interest of justice, and in the interest of economy of judicial time and effort[.]” See id., exh. A thereto at 158 and 162. As the Thames concedes, there is no indication in the trial record that that application was being made with respect to the present case as well. Id. at 3. Clearly that was the intent, however, given subsequent events outline below.
As the Thames is quick to point out, for nearly 25 years, until the filing of the present motions, it certainly appears that all parties considered the Thames to have been plaintiff herein. For example, in 1979, when the Counties filed a motion for summary judgment in this case and in the test cases, the Thames and the Wisconsin jointly filed a brief in opposition thereto. Id., exh. B thereto. Then, in 1983, attorney Locklear, who at that time was representing both the Thames and the Wisconsin, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the Thames, and sought substitution of another attorney to represent it. Reply Memorandum of Plaintiff Oneida of the Thames at 3. As the Thames astutely notes, in opposing that substitution motion the Counties filed a letter wherein they specifically refer to the Thames as a plaintiff, and further states that “[t] he ... Thames ... intervened as a plaintiff in this litigation [the reservation case] [.]” Id (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In fact, right at the beginning of that letter the Counties’ attorney in this action referred to this withdrawal motion “filed by the current attorneys ... for the plaintiff Oneida of the Thames [.] Id. exh C thereto at 1 (emphasis added). Finally, in 1990, the Thames and the Wisconsin again jointly filed a memorandum of law in opposition to a motion to consolidate by the Nation. Id. exh. D. thereto. At no time during any of those proceedings, did any party challenge the Thames’ status as a plaintiff to this action. As a foregoing shows, it certainly appears that until fairly recently the Counties considered the Thames to be a named plaintiff in this action, but now they re now objecting to adding the Thames as a plaintiff. Quite simply, it is too late in the day for this challenge to the Thames’ status as a plaintiff. Obviously, the parties hereto, as well as the court, have been treating the Thames as a plaintiff for nearly a quarter of a century. The court declines to hold, as the Counties urge, that the Thames should not be deemed to be a plaintiff hereto based upon what was at most procedural oversight which went unnoticed until the filing of the present motions. Consequently, to the extent the plaintiffs are seeking to add the Thames as a plaintiff to this action, the court grants such relief.

II Addition of Private Landowners
A. Summary of Arguments
In a pithy opinion, the Supreme Court in Forman v. Davis, 371 S.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 227 (1962), identified several factors which have become the benchmark for courts faced with Rule 15 (a) motions to amend. In deciding such motions the Forman Court instructed district courts to consider the following: “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc[.]” Id. at 182, 83 S. Ct at 230. Mechanically applying these factors, initially the plaintiffs argued that amendments should be allowed because they do not delay; there is no prejudice; and amendment would not be futile.

In an equally rote analysis, and also relying upon the Forman factors, the Counties conversely argued that amendment should not be allowed because it would result in “substantial prejudice” to them in terms of cost and delay. See co. Memo at 6. Furthermore, according to the Counties, it would be futile to allow amendment of plaintiffs’ complaints, at least with respect to the 20,000 private landholders because supposedly that proposed class does not satisfy the requirements for class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Finally, the Counties claim that these motions were brought in bad faith.
Shortly before the return date of the present motions, Oneida Ltd., who is not named as a punitive defendant, despite the fact that it purports to be the largest private owner in the disputed area, ... the largest private employer in the area and has been an integral part of the Oneida-Madison County community for fully 150 years [,]” filed a motion to intervene. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Oneida Ltd’s Renewed Motion for Leave to File its February 26, 1999 Memorandum of Law in Partial Opposition to the Plaintiffs’ Motions to Amend their Complaints’ as that of an Amicus Curiae (“Oneida Ltd. Memo.”) at 2 (citations omitted). Alternatively, Oneida Ltd. requested that it be granted amicus curlaie status; and there being no opposition to that request, the court granted same. See Tr. at 5. In opposing plaintiffs’ motions to amend, Oneida Ltd. is taking a different tack than the Counties. Focusing strictly upon the propriety of adding 20,000 private landholder, it asserts that there is no need to add that group as defendants because, broadly stated, plaintiffs can “obtain a just adjudication and the complete relief they say they seek” even in the absence of those individual defendants. See Oneida Ltd. Memo . at 2. Furthermore, Oneida Ltd. is taking the position that if the court agrees that “pursuant to the standard of federal Indian law and federal equity practice ..., the plaintiffs do not have the right to eject, dispossess, or recover damages from the private landowners[,]” then plaintiffs should not be allowed to amend their complaints to add the 20,000 landowners. See id. at 8. Additionally, Oneida Ltd. maintains that amendment should not be allowed because “[t] he potential prejudice to the innocent landowners” here is “staggering.” Id. at 17 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. State of New York., 691 F. 2d at 1070, 1082 (2d Cir. 1982) (Oneida Nation II). Oneida Ltd., also asserts that amendment “would result in a large, cumbersome defendant class action that would be difficult to manage and inevitably extend an already ancient case.” Id. at 20. Lastly, Oneida Ltd. reasons that the Oneidas’ motions to amend should be denied because they have unduly delayed in filing same some 25 years after the commencement of this action.Characterizing the issue as “one of management,” Tr. at 18, the Oneidas succinctly respond that they should be allowed to amend their complaint because it would the “most expeditious and fair way” to resolve this case. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion For Leave to File an Amended Complaint (“Oneida Memo.”) at 13. Otherwise, the Oneidas position, if amendment is disallowed, these claims will be resolved “in more than one lawsuit.” Tr. at 8; and 10-11.

B. Governing Legal Standards
Given that plaintiffs are seeking to add new defendants as well as new claims, their motions to amend implicated not only Rule 15 (a), which governs amendment of pleadings, but also Rule 20 (a), governing permissive joinder, and Rule 21, allowing joinder “of a person, who through inadvertence mistake or for some other reason. had not been made a party and whose presence as a party is later found necessary or desirable.” United States v. Hansel 999 F. Supp 694, 697 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Savine-Rivas v. Farina, CV-90-4335, 1992 WL 193668, at 1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug 4, 1992) (because the new complaint sought “to add not just new claims or updated facts [,] but also new parties[,]” along with Rule 15 (a), Rules 20 (a) and 21 were also involved). However, because “in practical terms [there is] little difference between” these three rules in that “[t] hey all leave the decision whether to permit or deny amendment to the district court’s discretion [,]” id. at 2, the court will not separately analyze the present motions under each of these three Rules.
No purpose would be served by that exercise because regardless of which Rule forms the basis for the court’s analysis of the present motions to amend, the analysis is substantially the same. See Clark v. Fonix Corp. 98 CIV. 6116, 1999 WL 105031 at 6 (S.D.N.Y. March 1, 1999) (“Although Rule 21, and not Rule 15 (a) normally governs the addition of new parties to an action, the same standard of liberality applies under either Rule.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). aff’d without published opinion. 199 F. 3d 1321 (2d Cir Oct. 14, 1999); Sheldon v. PHH Corp. 96 Civ 1966, 1977 WL 911280, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. March 4, 1997) citation omitted) (“[w]hile plaintiffs’ motion [to add a new defendant] properly [was] considered under Rule 21 rather than Rule 15, nothing material turns on this distinction [,] because “[u]nder either rule, leave the Court is required[,]” and “[to] the extent the limited case law under Rule 21 permits a conclusion, the standard under that rule is the same as under Rule 15”, aff’d on other grounds 135 F. 3d 848 (2d Cir. 2998); H.L. Hayden Co. of New York Inc. v. Siemens Medical Systems Inc. 112 F.R.D. 417, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) analyzing together under Rules 15, 20 and 21 proposed joinder of a defendant). Therefore, as did the court in Expoconsul Intern. Inc v. A/E Systems, Inc. 145 F.R.D. 336, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), “[b]ecause Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (a) better suits the arguments put forth by the parties,” this court will consider plaintiffs’ motions to amend under that Rule alone Cf State of New York v. Panex Industries Inc, 94-CV-0440E, 1997 WL 128369, at 2 (W.D.N.Y. March 14, 1997) footnote and citations omitted) (emphasis added) (“Inasmuch as responsive pleadings have been served and filed in this action the permissive standards and principles developed under Fed R. Civ. P. 15 (a) are to be used regardless of which rule is sought to be utilized.”) The principles governing amendment under Rule 15 (a) are well established, easily stated, and for the most part not seriously disputed here. “Once a responsive pleading has been served, “a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Jones v. New York State Div. of Military 166 F. 3d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 99) (quoting Fed R. Civ. P. 15 (a) (other citation omitted). Because leave to amend “shall be freely given,” generally “amendments are favored to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Black Radio Network, Inc. v. NYNBX Corp., 44 F Supp. 2d 565, 573, (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Conley v. Gibson 335 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S. Ct 99, 103 (1957) (other citations omitted). IN fact, as plaintiffs note, this court unequivocally stated that “[t] he obvious intent” of Rule 15 (a) “is to evince a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id at 1 see also Rachman Bag Co. V. Liberty Mut. Ins. co., 46 F. 3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Forman 317 U.S. at 182, 83 S. Xt at 230) (“The Supreme Court has emphasized that amendment should normally be permitted, and has stated that refusal to grant leave without justification is inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.” Indeed, “[t] he Supreme Court has made clear that [Rule 15 (a)’s mandate to be heeded [,].” Duffy 191 WL 44834 at 1 (quoting Forman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S. Ct at 230).

Given this liberal standard, “it is rare for an appellate court to disturb a district court’s discretionary decision to allow amendment [,]” Rachman Bag 46 F. 3d at 235 in that such decisions are subject to an abuse of direction standard review. See Lane Capital Management Inc v. Lane Capital Management Inc. 192 F. 3d 337, 342 (2d Cir 1999) citation omitted). by the same token, however, as this court is acutely aware, “outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion.” Forman 371 U.S. at 182, 83, S. Ct at 230 see also Anitec. 1991 WL 44834 at 2 quoting U.S. v. Continental Illinois Nat Bank and Trust 889 F. 2d 1248, 1254 (2d Cir 1989) Aas Forman makes equally and explicitly clear, that discretion must be exercised in terms of a justifying reason or reasons consonant with the liberalizing spirit of the Federal Rules.” In other words, despite the considerable latitude which Rule 15 (a) grants in terms of allowing amendments, “leave to amend should not not granted automatically or reflexively.” See Dessantis v. Roz-Ber INc. 51 F. Supp. 2d 244, 246 (E.D.N.Y.) 1999).
Here the court will separately address each of the Forman factors, recognizing that ultimately no single factor is determinative. Rather, resolution of these factually unique motions requires the court to engage in a careful balancing process under Forman and its progeny.

1. Undue Delay
The first Forman factor, “undue delay,” focuses upon whether the movant delayed in seeking leave to amend. Plaintiffs maintain that there is no undue delay here because they have not previously sought to amend their complaints. Moreover, this motion comes almost directly on the heels of the court lifting the stay, which had been in effect since January 1987. Plaintiffs also point to the fact that this action has been dormant for many years.
The Counties are not seriously challenging the timing of these motions to amend. In fact, during oral argument the Counties confirmed that they are not raising undue delay as a basis for denying these motions, because “we all know why this [case] has taken this long.” See Tr. at 77. The Counties did not elaborate, but presumably they were referring to the fact that during most of the time between the May 1974 filing of the complaint and the September 1998 reassignment to this court, the present action was stayed due to sporadic settlement efforts in this case and other related Oneida land claim litigation, including the test case.

Unlike the Counties, who all but conceded the timeliness of these motions to amend, amicus Oneida Ltd. vigorously presses the undue delay argument. Characterizing the delay here as “unduly excessive” given that a quarter century has elapsed since this case was first filed[,]” Oneida Ltd. contends such delay is “highly relevant” to the issue of whether plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their complaints to add the private landowners. Oneida Ltd. Memo. at 21 (emphasis in original). In arguing that the Tribal plaintiffs excessively delayed in bringing their motions to amend, Oneida Ltd. urges this court to deny their motions on that basis alone. Id. (citation omitted). Next, Oneida Ltd. objects to any suggestion by the Tribal plaintiffs that they delay in seeking amendment is somehow excused as part of a deliberate litigation strategy on the part of those plaintiffs.

As to the U.S., Oneida Ltd. contends that it too acted with undue delay in bringing its motion to amend. Disparagingly noting, among other things, that “it took the federal government over a generation to get around to making up its mind whether to intervene in this case,” Oneida Ltd deems “spurious” the U.S.’ argument that it did not act with undue delay because it filed its motion to amend only six months after it was allowed to intervene herein, and only three months after the lifting of the stay. Id. at 23. Oneida Ltd. then attacks the U.S for failing to “warn[] the innocent landowners off the land, [and] instead ... actively benefit[ting] from the taxes it has levied on the rents, incomes, and profits generated from the use and development of the area.” Id., at 23-24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Reasoning that in its view the U.S. has delayed over 200 years in compensating “the Oneida for its large share of the original wrongdoing[,]” and also pointing to the U.S.’ “historic wrongdoing and its present refusal to waive sovereign immunity,” Oneida Ltd. chides the U.S.’ proffered justification for seeking amendment, which is “to bring to final judgment all possible claims, against all possible parties[.]” See U.S. Memo. at 2.
Delay must be considered in context; not all delay will result in denial of a motion to amend. However, “the district court plainly has discretion to deny leave to amend where the motion is made after an inordinate delay, no satisfactory explanation is made for the delay, and the amendment would prejudice the defendant.” MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equipment Financing, Inc., 157 F.3d 956, 962 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “mere delay, absent a showing of bad faith or undue prejudice, does not provide a basis for denial of leave to amend[.]” Messier v. Southbury Training School, 3:94-CV-1706, 1999 WL 20907, at #3 (D.Conn, Jan. 5, 1999) (citing State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d Cir. 1981)). In fact, “[g]enerally[,] [even] unexcused delay ... will not bar [amendment] if no prejudice will ensue to the other parties.” H.L. Hayden Co. of New York, Inc. v. Siemens Medical Systems Inc., 112 F.R.D. 417, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citation omitted). By the same token, though, “if a lengthy delay [does] exist[] before a motion to amend is made, it is incumbent upon the movant to offer a valid explanation for the delay.” Deare v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 175 F.R.D. 157, 166 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing, inter alia, Evans v. Syracuse City School Dist., 704 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1983)). Not surprisingly, the “longer the period of an unexplained delay, the less will be required of the nonmoving party in terms of a showing of prejudice.” Block v. First Blood Assocs., 988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 1993).
Any case in which there has been a 25 year gap between the filing of the original complaint and a subsequent motion to amend must necessarily give the court pause. There is some superficial appeal to Oneida Ltd.’s arguments that it is simply too late in the day, especially for the Oneidas, to be amending their complaints to add some 20,000 new defendants. In the end, however, delay does not factor heavily into the court’s analysis of whether to allow amendment herein. To be sure, a considerable amount of time has elapsed since the commencement of this action and the filing of these motions to amend. The court cannot ignore the realities of this unparalleled litigation though. This case is still in its initial stages, with no discovery having been conducted and until now motion practice had been minimal and of no real import. And, if the court’s experience in other similar litigation is any indicator, a trial date easily could be years away. Thus, despite the fact that 26 years have passed since the commencement of this action, for all intents and purposes, it is still in the very early stages of what undoubtedly will be extremely protracted litigation.
What is more, the delay here is not attributable solely to the Tribal plaintiffs. It is a delay occasioned by all of the parties to this litigation. The Counties themselves acknowledged as much in 1990 when, in opposing consolidation, they explained that “although sixteen years old,” the case “ha[d] not been litigated at all.” Taylor Aff., exh, G thereto at 3. A decade ago the Counties further explained that the present case was “simply sitting awaiting the ultimate outcome in [the test case.]” Id. The Counties along with the other parties hereto willingly agreed, or at the very least sat silently by through the years, allowing this case to languish in wholly unproductive settlement efforts. Thus, if blame is to be placed for the delay, it must be placed squarely at the feet of all litigants hereto who adopted a deliberate strategy of negotiating first and litigating second as a last resort.
The nearly 25 year delay between the filing of the Oneidas’ complaints and the filing of the present motions undoubtedly constitutes an inordinate delay. By the same token, however, “the amendment has not been delayed unduly, at least when measured within the life of the current federal suit[,]” which by any standards is far from the typical, run-of-the-mill federal action. See Dodson v. The New York Times Company, No. 97 Civ. 3838 LAP, 1998 WL 702277, at #5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1998) (footnote omitted). As some point “delay [does] become[] fatal,” but that point has not been reached in this litigation. See Cooper v. Lubell, 83 Civ. 2506, 1987 WL 14468, at #2 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, although Oneida Ltd. strongly implies that delay alone is a sufficient basis for denying a motion to amend, the court disagrees. See Rotter v. Leahy, 93 F.Supp.2d 487, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citation omitted) (“Typically, the moving party’s delay, standing alone, is not sufficient reason to foreclose amendment.”) This is not to say that there will never be a case where delay alone is a sufficient basis for precluding amendment. See, e.g., Hickman v. U.S., 43 Fed.Cl. 424, 439 (1999) (and cases cited therein), aff’d without published opinion, 2000 WL 266486 (Fed. Cir. March 8, 2000). Nonetheless, in a case of this magnitude and atypical history, there is no basis for denying amendment based solely upon the Oneidas’ delay in filing these motions.

Likewise, the court finds no undue delay on the part of the U.S. in seeking amendment. In fact, because the U.S. only became a party to this action in June 1998, and because it moved for intervention six months later, it is in a vastly different position that the Tribal plaintiffs. The relative speed with which the U.S. moved to amend — six months after being granted intervenor status — makes it nearly impossible for the court to take seriously Oneida Ltd.’s undue delay argument as it pertains to the U.S.
Having found no undue delay in the filing of these motions to amend, the court will next consider whether the Counties would be unduly prejudiced by allowing amendment.

2. Undue Prejudice
In response to the claims of undue prejudice, which will be more fully discussed momentarily, the Oneidas, but not the U.S., argue that “perhaps [the] most significant[]” reason that the Counties’ claim of undue prejudice is without merit is because they, along with the proposed defendants, have been on notice of this action at least since 1970 when the test case was filed. See Oneida Memo. at 17. In particular, the Oneidas posit that the landowners should have had common knowledge of this litigation through the numerous newspaper articles which have been published through the years, as well as title insurance policies and purchase contracts on homes. The private landowners also should have had notice of this lawsuit well before now, the Oneidas assert, because in a related action this court certified a defendant class of landowners in accordance with Rule 23, and required notification of same. See Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. State of N.Y., 85 F.R.D. 701 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (“Wisconsin”).

The court finds Oneidas’ notice argument unpersuasive. In the first place, even assuming that the prospective defendants had prior notice of this litigation, the Oneidas have not explained how such notice would undermine the claims of prejudice which the Counties and Oneida Ltd are raising. Moreover, the court has serious doubts as to whether all of the 20,000 prospective defendants had prior notice of this lawsuit.
Certainly the Oneidas cannot rely upon the notification which this court ordered in Wisconsin because there no notice was required to landowners residing on and using two acres or less of land as their principal residence. See id. at 709-10. This court in Wisconsin limited the class to exclude the residential landowners so that the resulting class would be relatively more manageable — 60,000, as opposed to 500,000 landowners. See id. at 706-08. Given that limitation, the private landowners in this case, many of whom the court assumes, as in Wisconsin, reside on less than two acres of property, reasonably could have assumed that they would not be named as defendants herein.
Nor is the court willing to impute knowledge to these private landowners based upon newspaper articles, title insurance and the like. Over the years, based upon such documents, as well as oral statements by the Oneidas themselves, the landowners also reasonably could have assumed that the Oneidas would not seek to eject their neighboring private landowners. For these same reasons, it would also have been reasonable for the private landowners to have assumed that the Oneidas would not seek to hold them financially responsible for alleged historical wrongs occurring over 200 years also. Thus, as will be seen, although the court finds that no undue prejudice will result from allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaints, lack of notice to the private landowners is not a basis for that finding.

“[P]rejudice alone is insufficient to justify a denial of leave to amend; rather the necessary showing is ’undue prejudice to the opposing party.’” A.V. By Versace, Inc. v. Gianni Versace S.P.A., 87 F.Supp.2d 281, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Forman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. at 230) (emphasis added by Versace court) (other citations omitted). In determining what constitutes undue prejudice, courts “generally consider whether the assertion of the new claim or defense would (i) require the opponent to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; (ii) significantly delay the resolution of the dispute; or (iii) prevent the plaintiff from bringing a timely action in another jurisdiction.” Monahan v. New York City of Corrections, 214 F.3d 275, pet. for cert. filed (Sept. 6, 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Of these three factors, only the first two are at issue here.
Insofar as the potential to delay resolution of the dispute is concerned, the addition of numerous parties will “significantly delay resolution of this lawsuit,” argue the Counties, causing them “substantial[] prejudice[.]” See Co. Memo. at 5. Plaintiffs counter that amendment will not cause such a delay because to date there has been no discovery, no motion practice to speak of, and no other meaningful litigation efforts, save the present motions. This action still is in the “very early stages[,]” so there is “nothing to reopen or relitigate.” See Oneida Memo. at 17; see also U.S. Memo at 6.

It is beyond dispute that the Oneidas significantly delayed in bringing these motions to amend. An unexplained delay means that the non-moving party has to show less in terms of prejudice. See Brass Construction v. Muller, No. 98 Civ. 5452, 1998 WL 755164, at #2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1998) (citing Evans, 704 F.2d at 46-47). This is so because “the risk of prejudice increases with the passage of time.” Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 916 F.Supp. 333, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But here, the Oneidas did explain their delay, albeit not entirely to the court’s satisfaction. Further, although this case is the oldest on the court’s docket, pending over 26 years, the court cannot ignore the fact that in terms of active litigation, this case is no farther along than more recently filed cases. Thus, because the Oneidas did offer an explanation for delaying in seeking amendment, and because despite its 1974 filing date, this case still is in its infancy, the Counties, as the non-movants, must, make a greater showing in terms of prejudice.

In the end the prejudice inquiry involves a balancing process. The court must “weigh[] the potential for prejudice resulting from granting the amendment against the risk of prejudice to the moving party if the amendment is denied.” H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 417, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the non-movants, the Counties carry the burden in the balancing process “of demonstrating that substantial prejudice would result were the proposed amendment to be granted.” See (citations omitted); Anitec, 1991 WL 44834, at #1 (same).

Attempting to satisfy that burden, the Counties identify a host of reasons as to why amendment will “significantly delay resolution” of this action: (1) possibility of “immediate[]” appeal of any class certification order which this court might grant, see Co. Memo. at 6; (2) necessity of new counsel becoming familiar with this action; (3) exacerbation and additional delay of already complex discovery; (4) “fact-specific defenses of private landowners[,]” id. at 8; and (5) an increase in motion practice, and in number of defenses, cross-claims, counterclaims and issues which result from the addition of new parties. The court is not satisfied however that any of these factors will significantly delay resolution of this action.

a. Potential Delay to Final Resolution
It is well settled that “one of the most important considerations in determining whether amendment would be prejudicial is the degree to which it would delay ... final disposition of the action.” Krumme v. Westpoint Stevens Inc., 143 F.3d 71, 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1041, 119 S.Ct. 592 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, there is a relationship between delay and prejudice such that “prejudice tends to increase with delay[.]” See Saxholm AS v. Dynal, Inc., 938 F.Supp. 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (and cases cited therein). Accordingly, “a proposed amendment ... [is] especially prejudicial ... [when] discovery ha[s] already been completed and [the non-movant] ha[s] already filed a motion for summary judgment.” Krumme, 143 F.3d at 88 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, although the court is separately examining delay and prejudice, it cannot ignore the nexus between these two Forman factors. Below, the court will briefly examine each of these aspects of potential delay.

The court finds completely without merit any claimed delay which might result if the court grants these motions; certifies a defendant class; grants the Counties permission to file an interlocutory appeal of the certification order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292; and if pursuant to that statute, the Second Circuit agrees to consider such an appeal. Plainly, this whole scenario is speculative. Not only are the Counties assuming that this court will permit amendment and certify a defendant class, but they are assuming that this court will grant them leave to file an interlocutory appeal — an issue which this district court has “first line discretion” to grant or deny. See Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 47, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 1210 (1995). The Counties are further assuming that the Court of Appeals would exercise its discretion and “permit and appeal to be taken from such order” of the district court. See 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (West 1993). Even is such an appeal was not so highly speculative, the immediate delay which supposedly would result from same would be a delay occasioned by the Counties themselves. Surely this is not the type of delay which would establish undue prejudice so as to warrant denial of a Rule 15 motion to amend.
Nor does the court find persuasive the Counties’ delay argument based upon the fact that the addition of new parties will require new counsel to become familiar with the prior proceedings in this action. Given the current posture of this case, the court is at a complete loss as to how the Counties can claim that amendment will cause delay because “[m]any sophisticated issues of law and fact have been litigated ... over the years.” See Co. Memo. at 7 (emphasis added). This comment is puzzling, to say the least, when there has been almost no active litigation in this case. Indeed, as land claim litigation goes, despite its age, the filings in the particular case are relatively few, so in that respect any competent lawyer should be able to quickly become familiar with this case in a relatively short time.

Next, the Counties’ assert that the addition of new parties will require “highly fact-intensive” discovery, thus further complicating and prolonging discovery which the Counties anticipate will be complex enough as it is. See id. at 7. Such discovery may well be necessary irrespective of whether or not additional parties are joined, however. Therefore, this argument carries little weight with the court. Furthermore, delay attributable to discovery is not a very convincing reason for denying amendment here because if the individual landowners are named as defendants herein, then, as in Cayuga, most likely a class would be certified, at least for purposes of establishing liability, if any. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Carey, 89 F.R.D. 627, 633 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (“Cayuga I”) (McCurn, S.J.) Thus, as in Cayuga, counsel for the class would coordinate all of the discovery efforts and motion practice on behalf of those landowners.

Equally weak is the Counties’ argument that any delay attributable to “fact-specific defenses of private landowners” and equitable considerations “is sufficiently prejudicial to the[ir] ... right to a speedy resolution” of this matter as to mandate denial of plaintiffs’ motion to join the landowners as defendants. See Co. Memo. at 8. As Cayuga has shown, it is possible to structure these land claim cases so that individual defendants are effectively removed therefrom, both in terms of liability and damages.
Several other reasons which the Counties assert will cause prejudicial delay in resolving this litigation fall into the category of grasping at straws. The Counties claim that additional parties will result in more motion practice, more and perhaps different defenses, more cross-claims and counterclaims, and more litigation pertaining to damages. Even assuming this worst case scenario, the Counties fail to recognize that “mere ’time, effort and money’ do[] not rise to the level of ’substantial prejudice.’” See Brass Construction, 1998 WL 755164, at #2 (quoting Block, 988 F.2d at 351). This is especially true in the present case where, by statute, defense costs are borne by the State. See N.Y. State L. 10 (McKinney 1995). In any event, because this litigation already is so complex, regardless of the number of parties involved, the expenditure of time, energy, and money here undoubtedly will be very substantial. Simply put, try as they might, the Counties are unable to convince this court that allowing amendment will result in a significant delay in resolving this action, so as to rise to the level of undue prejudice to them.

b. Expenditure of Significant Additional Resources
The Counties fare no better with their argument that allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint will force the Counties to expend “significant additional resources[.]” See Co. Memo. at 10. This particular factor is almost meaningless in this context where apparently money has been no object when it comes to either pursuing or defending these claims. Obviously, the court has not had occasion to review a billing statement from any of the counsel. It requires little imagination, though, even taking into account a matter as simple as number of lawyers present in court for any given proceeding, that money is being spent here without impunity. To the extent that granting the motions may require the Counties to expend additional resources such as time and effort, the court cannot find that such expenditures would rise to the level of undue prejudice. By its very nature, land claim litigation is extremely complex and, regardless of the number of parties involved, it requires considerable time, energy, money, not to mention sheer will, to successfully pursue or defend such an action. Thus, the court cannot find, as the Counties urge, that the expenditure of additional resources would be so prejudicial as to mandate denial of plaintiffs’ motions to amend.

In short, the court does not find that there is undue prejudice here in terms of either the potential for delay in resolving this action, or in terms of the expenditure of significant additional resources.

3. Bad Faith
In opposing these motions to amend, the Counties vigorously contend that all of the plaintiffs have acted in bad faith by employing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) for purposes of impermissible “legal gamesmanship.” See Co. Memo. at 12 (citation omitted). The Counties offer two reasons which they claim are indicative of plaintiffs’ bad faith herein. The first is notice: because plaintiffs knew or should have known when they filed their respective complaints (the Tribal plaintiffs in 1974 and the U.S. in 1998) that they could have sought to repossess the subject property and name the individual private landowners as defendants, their failure to do so violates the spirit and intent of Rule 15. Secondly, the Counties maintain that plaintiffs have acted in bad faith because these motions to amend are nothing more than an oblique attempt to coerce the State into settlement. Hence, in the Counties’ view, plaintiffs are invoking the liberal amendment provisions of Rule 15 for an impermissible motive — to force a settlement.
Oneida Ltd. is not making a bad faith argument per se. Many of the arguments which it makes in connection with undue delay are, however, tantamount to asserting bad faith in that they relate to plaintiffs’ motives for seeking to amend at this juncture. Furthermore, as will become apparent, there are several striking similarities between Oneida Ltd.’s “undue delay” arguments and the Counties’ bad faith arguments. Therefore, even though Oneida Ltd. is raising these arguments, such as notice and improper notice, in the context of undue delay, the court finds the same to be highly relevant to the bad faith inquiry which it must make under Forman; and hence it will address the same now.

Like the Counties, Oneida Ltd. seriously questions plaintiffs’ motives in seeking to join the private landowners so many years after the filing of the complaints in this action. The Oneidas’ decision not to join the private landowners as defendants some 25 years ago is, as Oneida Ltd. describes it, “a purely strategic move [,]” which even standing alone is “fatal” to these motions to amend. See Oneida Ltd. Memo. at 22. More specifically, like the Counties, in essence Oneida Ltd. contends that the Tribal plaintiffs’ delay in seeking leave to amend constitutes bad faith because those plaintiffs were on notice at the filing of the original complaint in 1974 that the individuals landowners could have been named as defendants therein. Id. (quoting 6 C. Wright, A. Miller, and M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1488, p. 688 (1990) (collecting cases)). Next, Oneida Ltd. directly attacks the Tribal plaintiffs’ assertion that by waiting to file these motions to amend, they were doing nothing more than adopting a litigation strategy aimed at “minimal disruption.” See id. at 22 (citation omitted). Then, again, as do the Counties, Oneida Ltd. asserts that the proposed addition of 20,000 private landowners is nothing but maneuvering on the part of the Oneidas “to gain a tactical advantage against the State so as ’to pressure [it] into reaching a settlement.’” Id. at 23 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

The Oneidas strenuously dispute the charge of bad faith, explaining that once the Supreme Court held in 1985, inter alia, that they could maintain a federal common law based action for violation of their possessory rights, see Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 236, 105 S.Ct. at 1252, they chose negotiation in all of the related Oneida actions rather than further litigation. Failure of those negotiation efforts, argue the Oneidas, necessitated the filing of these motions. In light of the foregoing, the Oneidas disdainfully remark that the Counties’ cries of bad faith are “simply wrong[,]” “[a]t best” and “[a]t worst, ... irresponsible rhetoric[.]” Oneida Reply Memo. at 3 (footnote omitted).

Distancing itself from the Tribal plaintiffs, the U.S. refutes the bad faith arguments by reiterating that it only became a party to this action fairly recently when it was granted intervenor status in June 1998; and it filed its amendment motion six months thereafter. Accordingly, the U.S. reasons that its motion to amend was not filed in bad faith and it is not, as the Counties suggest, engaging in “legal gamesmanship.” U.S. Response at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Few courts have denied leave to amend on the basis of bad faith. See Dodson v. The New York Times Company, No. 97 Civ. 3838 LAP, 1998 WL 702277, at #9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1998); but see Rotter, 93 F.Supp. at 496 (recognizing that “[t]he possibility of bad faith is, in and of itself,” justification for denying a motion to amend). As a result, there is little case law within this Circuit to guide this court in terms of what constitutes bad faith as a ground for denying leave to amend. It is well established, however, that “when the opponent of an amendment asserts that the movant is acting in bad faith, there must be something more than mere delay or inadvertence” to warrant denial of a Rule 15 motion. See Primetime 24 Joint Venture and Primetime 24 Relay Corporation v. Directv, Inc. No. 99CTV.3307, 2000 WL 426396, at #5 (S.D.N.Y. April 20, 2000) (citing, inter alia, Evans, 704 F.2d at 47). By the same token, under certain circumstances “[d]elay as a predicate for a finding of bad faith is a sufficient reason to deny leave to amen[,]” especially when accompanied by undue delay or prejudice. See Town of New Windsor, 919 F.Supp. 662, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citation omitted).
A finding that a party is seeking leave to amend solely to gain a tactical advantage, also supports a finding that such an amendment is made in bad faith. State Trading v. Assuranceforeningen Skuld, 921 F.2d 409, 417-18 (2d Cir. 1990), is illustrative in this regard. The Second Circuit in State Trading affirmed the denial of a motion to amend where the plaintiff delayed raising certain claims to gain a strategic advantage over the defendant. There, only well after the defendant challenged the applicability of Connecticut law did the plaintiff attempt to amend its complaint to include foreign law based causes of action. The Second Circuit agreed with defendant’s observation that plaintiff “deliberately chose not to amend its complaint earlier to include [such] causes of action because any admission that foreign law applied ... would have increased the chance of dismissal on forum selection clause or forum non conveniens grounds. Id. at 418. Thus, relying upon the fact that plaintiff’s “decision not to plead the additional causes of action was a tactical one,” combined with the fact that with no justification plaintiff waited an “unreasonably long” time in seeking leave to amend, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to amend. Id.; see also Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v. Harry L. Laws Company, Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1164 (5th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted) (noting that “it is improper to amend solely to gain a tactical advantage[]”).

The history of this litigation in terms of the private landowners, as set forth below, convinces the court that plaintiffs’ “request for leave to amend reflects an evolutionary development that falls under the heading of bad faith.” See Lee v. Regal Cruises, Ltd., 916 F.Supp. 300,304 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d without published opinion, 116 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 1997).

a. Oneidas
As to the Oneidas, the primary basis for the court’s finding of bad faith is that since even before the filing of this lawsuit, they have steadfastly maintained that they were not seeking to disrupt the current landowners in any way. Now, despite 30 years of assurances to the contrary, the Oneidas are completely abandoning their conciliatory attitude toward the private landowners. Through these motions the Oneidas are seeking, inter alia, a remedy which would allow them to dispossess the private landowners of the property upon which they are currently residing. The Oneidas also are seeking to hold these landowners liable for monetary damages. See Taylor Aff., exh. A thereto at 25, 68.

Presumably the Oneidas have always intended to eventually regain possession of the subject land through transactions between willing sellers and buyers. Until the filing of these motions to amend, however, they did not specifically claim entitlement to possession. For example, even prior to the commencement of the test case, in 1968, in a Complaint and Petition to the President of the United States (“the 1968 Petition”), in language which could not be more definite, the Nation declared:

Be it clearly understood that the Oneida Nation has no purpose or wish to eject from such lands the innocent people who now have record title to them and reside thereon ... The Oneida Nation wishes to secure from the State ... only fair and just compensation for the lands unlawfully taken from them without due process of law.
Id. at 3 (quoting 1968 Complaint and Petition to the President of the United States) (emphasis added), reprinted in George C. Shattuck, The Oneida Land Claims: A Legal History, p. 90 (1991). In that same Petition, the Oneidas unequivocally declared that “[t]he people who now occupy the former Reservation should be left peacefully there, but the Oneida Nation should have justice too.” 1968 Petition at 106 (emphasis added). The Oneidas now have abandoned these laudable goals by bringing the present motions — a course of action which this court cannot condone.

When the Oneidas commenced this action more than 25 years ago, they were aware of tensions which would likely result from litigation such as this. Indeed, so eager were the Oneidas to assuage public concern about litigation of this nature that they explicitly averred in their 1974 complaint that “[i]t has always been the policy of the Oneida Indians to live in peace and trust and friendship with their neighbors.” Taylor Aff., exh. F thereto at 6, 19. The Oneidas’ initial approach was wise and tempered and until these motions the court had no reason to believe that the Oneidas would seek to evict private property owners; or, for that matter, that they would seek to hold current landowners individually liable for monetary damages.

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